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One of the tasks of critical cosmopolitanism is precisely clear-
ing up the encumbrances of the past. The other is to point 
toward the future.
Walter Mignolo, “The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis”
Without doubt, theories of cosmopolitanism have themselves become 
more and more cosmopolitan.1 No longer simply referring to a post-
national, rootless world traveller, a place of diverse consumption, or 
the critique of home, this “fundamental devotion to the interests of 
humanity as a whole” (Robbins, “Introduction” 1) has recently come 
under rigorous retheorization and has been ascribed a widening range 
of liberatory and analytic uses. Critiquing both its undercurrent of 
Eurocentric universalism and assumed aestheticism, Bruce Robbins and 
Pheng Cheah have usefully brought the new project of “cosmopolitics” 
to the fore, in which questions of access, obligation, ethics and global 
justice are balanced with an awareness that cosmopolitanism is always 
“located and embodied” and must be “pluralize[d] and particularize[d]” 
(Robbins, “Introduction” 2–3). Along with these revisions come the 
newly included cosmopolites—refugees, forced laborers, non-elite mi-
grants—that have spurned a variety of cosmopolitanisms “from below”. 
More than proliferating terms and extending membership, however, 
such theorizations allow us to understand that cosmopolitanism is nei-
ther a thing nor an attitude, but an ethical and political framework in 
which to organize meanings and negotiations between peoples, nations, 
universals and particularities. 
In this article, I want to shift to shift attention from the recent work 
on subaltern cosmopolitanisms2 to revisit an ongoing debate around the 
relevance of cosmopolitanism for postcolonial or Third World nation-
states, especially in view of their often perceived abuse of human rights 
in the form of dictatorships and authoritarianism. As a theory that seeks 
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to develop a concept of peace and justice across nations in the context 
of contemporary globalization, cosmopolitanism is arguably the obvi-
ous corrective to the excesses of the inward-looking, despotic nation-
state. Yi Munyo˘l’s 1987 novella, Our Twisted Hero, an award-winning 
allegorical depiction of South Korean dictatorship, brings this debate 
firmly into focus. Described by reviewers as a story of “oppression, tyr-
anny, authoritarianism, corruption, revenge” and written at a time when 
Korea “was being strangled by a dictatorship” (Crown 138), it has been 
translated into English, French, German, Italian and Hebrew. I want to 
consider how this text works through an idea of cosmopolitanism as a 
potential counterforce to the illiberal, dictatorial nation-state. At stake 
here is to parse an idea of cosmopolitanism that, in light of recent work, 
is not reducible to a synonym of Euro-American multiculturalism, or 
elite global connectedness. In doing so, I aim to go beyond a reading 
of the plight of the unfree postcolonial world—what Tim Brennan has 
described as “the Third World political nightmare” (5) of newly decolo-
nized states—that merely confirms the liberties of the First. Implicit in 
my argument is a questioning of cosmopolitanism as the unencumbrance 
from the local and the particular. I am interested, rather, in considering 
the ways particular global forces—the international economic division 
of labor, the critique of the nation-state, human rights discourses, U.S.-
style democratic liberalism—produce distinct and unexpected render-
ings of cosmopolitanism in Yi’s remarkable novella. Not least, I examine 
the privileged role that literary allegory plays in both the representation 
of “oppression, tyranny, authoritarianism” and its apparent opposite, 
freedom. To begin, I review some questions around cosmopolitan cul-
ture from the postcolonial perspective; I then move to a close reading of 
Yi’s novella and its alternative understanding of the cosmopolitan. 
1. The Production of Global Culture 
Notwithstanding renewed scholarly attention to Kant’s 1796 essay, 
Towards Perpetual Peace, much of the last two decades of cosmopolitan-
ism scholarship has been absorbed with the post-1990 period as the 
era when globalization, or “one world” thinking, finally and definitively 
came into its own. Certainly, this is the recognizable moment of the 
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decline of the Soviet bloc, the consolidation of multi-national corpora-
tions, neoliberal ideology, postnationalist sentiments and the rise of new 
communication technologies. Yet, if our world “is marked by an experi-
ence of an ever-shrinking and interconnected globe”, it is paradoxically 
“a world whose character is at the same time harder to visualize” (Surin, 
“On Producing” 210). In other words, the uneven global processes that 
are the very preconditions for ideas of cosmopolitanism are concealed 
by the emphasis on fluid, transnational cultural forms. What needs to 
be excavated is the story of cosmopolitanism as not merely a recent 
surge of ethical/political longing that complicates (but not necessarily 
eliminates) national territoriality, but as a force that has long existed in 
conjunction with, and in response to, a number of difference-producing 
global forces. 
Consider one set of these defining shifts: the consolidation of global 
capitalism, the multinational corporate entity and the end of any per-
ceived alternative economic regime. It is important to note that this 
major transformation of capitalism—the post-World War II diffusion 
of post-Fordism—began in the late 1960s to early 1970s and has had 
the effect of producing greater differentiation across the world at the 
same time it has unified economies into a single system. By the 1990s 
and 2000s such a fact seems all too naturalized into the “global north” 
and “south”, or the developed world and the developing. Kenneth Surin 
points out how the moment of post-Fordism creates a new organiza-
tion of the planet, where levels of production are split along First/Third 
world geographies. In this global division of labor, the production of 
material things (clothing, cars, electronics etc) 
is effectively … relegated to the peripheral and semiperipheral 
nations. What takes place in the capitalist centers today is some-
thing quite different, a kind of production that is akin to a pro-
duction of production, a higher-order or metaproduction, with 
markets that deal not so much in goods or merchandise … as in 
stocks, services and instruments for the telematic orchestration 
of images and spectacles. The domain in which these orchestra-
tions take place is of course culture. (“On Producing” 205)
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What Surin indicates is a globalizing tendency which pulls in two direc-
tions.3 Capitalist processes disregard national boundaries in an unprec-
edented way allowing for accumulation to happen outside the vistas 
(and controls) of the majority of individual nation-states; meanwhile, 
the roles that “peripheral and semiperipheral” nations—the former co-
lonial world—play continue to be limited and subordinate. Since their 
only option for development remains the production of goods for the 
global north, peripheral nations will never be in a position to determine 
the rules of that global regime of accumulation, that is, “the production 
of production.”4 As Surin points out, the operations of this economic 
division of labor find their correlate (or perhaps alibi) in a certain kind 
of cultural production he terms “global culture”. Of the many critiques 
of such a concept, Tim Brennan has provided one of the best known. 
For Brennan, the positing of a “global culture” contributes to both the 
idea of a world “exempt from national belonging” (2), and the flattening 
effect of a “cosmopolitan embrace”—the “articulation of a new world 
literature designed to capture the global juxtapositions that have begun 
to force their way even into private experience” (Brennan 4). Thus, liter-
ary works by exemplary “cosmopolitan” writers such as Salman Rushdie 
or Isabelle Allende smooth over the uglier dimensions of globalization 
and function primarily to cosmopolitanize Euro-American reading pub-
lics. In other words, “cosmopolitan culture” is something Third World 
writers confer on the West. Such fictions may then shore up legitimate, 
but ultimately one-sided, questions such as: how might America pass 
from multiculturalism to cosmopolitanism? or how can the EU recon-
figure itself to become more tolerant of “otherness”?5 Meanwhile, as the 
celebrity Third World cosmopolites confirm the universality of Euro-
American cultural and political values, the actual predicament of Third 
World nations—the very reasons behind the migration or exile of the 
Rushdies, Naipauls or García Márquezes—goes ignored. Thus, while 
our current moment is perceived as more cosmopolitan than previous 
eras, we need equally to recognize that the differential effects of global 
capital, especially since the 1970s, mean that in many ways, we are as 
far from “one world” as we have ever been. Despite the transnational 
appeal of Yi’s story, I see the novella’s “winning entrance … into Western 
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readers’ imagination” (Steinberg 64) not as evidence of its participation 
in such a “global” or “cosmopolitan” culture. Instead, I consider its his-
torical embeddedness within a globalizing system of post-Fordism, and 
ask, as Cheah does, what can the concept of cosmopolitanism mean for 
those outside the metropolitan centers, “who do not have the option 
of postnationalism through transnational migrancy” (Cheah, “Given 
Culture” 318)?
2. National Allegory: Yi Munyo˘l
Born in 1948, Yi Munyo˘l is one of South Korea’s most celebrated 
and prolific postwar writers. He is author of several important short 
story collections and over twenty novels, as well as best-selling works 
of essays and translations. Like many of his generation, his writing is 
particularly interested in issues of political ideology that, to this day, 
divide the Korean peninsula. Such a concern has a personal dimension: 
when he was a child, Yi’s father defected to the North leaving his family 
tainted by their association with a communist, and prey to harassment 
and police surveillance (Suh 727). Yet his incredible corpus includes 
work on almost every imaginable social reality of postwar South Korea, 
from industrial unions (Kuro Arirang [1987]) to divided families (An 
Appointment with my Brother [1994]) and essays on Korean feminism; 
Suh writes that he is “a master of all fictional forms” (728) including 
short stories, novels, drama and satire. Perhaps none of his works has 
captured so much international attention nor been so widely translated 
as his short, pithy schoolyard tale Our Twisted Hero (Uridu˘l u˘i ilgu˘rojin 
yo˘ngung). Winner of the prestigious Yi Sang Award in Korea and im-
mediately translated into English, the novella has been compared to 
William Golding’s Lord of the Flies (Crown 138) and been received as a 
timeless depiction of power and corruption. 
On the surface, Hero is the deceptively simple story of a primary 
school transfer student, Han Pyongt’ae, and his dealings with the class 
bully, Om Sokdae. From his very first day at the new school, Pyongt’ae 
discovers something odd about his new class: all the boys, and even the 
teacher, are under the sway of Sokdae, a student of uncommon power, 
size and cunning. For refusing to submit to Sokdae’s classroom author-
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ity, the protagonist finds himself alienated and tormented, although “[p]
ersecution and discrimination invariably only came when Sokdae stood 
some distance away” (26). Much of the story narrates how, punished by 
Sokdae’s extensive network of class monitors, beaten up and excluded 
from after-school outings, Pyongt’ae is eventually forced to submit to 
the regime. At an obvious level, it is the story of acquiescence to power 
and an allegory of South Korea under its numerous military leaders, es-
pecially its most notorious and long-term dictator, General Park Chung 
Hee, in power from 1961 until his assassination in 1979.
While commentators respond to its universal themes of power and 
corruption, it is set, significantly and specifically, in 1959–60, the year 
leading up to the student-led revolution against an earlier and less known 
autocrat: South Korea’s first president, the U.S.-installed Syngman Rhee 
(president from 1948–1960). The hopes of this revolutionary move-
ment were crushed just a year later in 1961 by General Park—a former 
Japanese Army official—and his coup d’etat, setting the stage for the 
following decades of dictatorship and brutal industrialization. Park’s 
two-decade rule was characterized by virulent anti-communism, the re-
pression of labor and most civil rights, while universities, churches, the 
media and any suspected communist sympathizer came under govern-
ment scrutiny and often KCIA surveillance.6 At the same time—in a 
state-private enterprise agreement typical of developmental states—he 
brought the private sector under control by arresting “illicit profiteers” 
who were released on agreement to invest in state-chosen industries and, 
following the Japanese model of export-led development, began the first 
wave of heavy industrialization based on cement, synthetic fiber, elec-
tricity, fertilizer, iron and oil refinery industries (Kim 82). He won the 
approval of U.S. presidents Kennedy and Johnson, cutting a deal with 
the latter to send 300,000 Korean troops to fight in the Vietnam War 
in return for infrastructural and military aid (Kim 104). Only a few 
decades after gaining independence from Japanese colonial rule (1910–
1945), South Korea’s dramatic leap in industry and GDP made it one 
of the most “successful” of Third World nations and exemplar of the 
so-called Asian miracle economies. Its postwar career is often celebrated 
as the prototype of Third World industrialization, that—as described 
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above—played an essential if subaltern role in the global transition to 
post-Fordist capitalism. What usually goes unremarked are the means 
by which this remarkable advance was achieved. 
Our Twisted Hero, however, is actually written in 1987, the year of 
South Korea’s long-awaited political liberalization and the conclusion of 
almost thirty years of military rule. It is from this moment that the adult 
narrator looks back on his childhood, allowing Yi to revisit, take stock 
of, and analyse the conditions that lead to the failures of the 1960 revo-
lution from the vantage point of another political moment. The extent 
to which the novella is an allegorical act of reimagining the moment 
prior to the Park era is evident in the first paragraph, which describes the 
indelible mark the traumatic school year made on the narrator:
It’s been nearly thirty years already, but whenever I look back 
on that lonely, difficult fight, which continued from the spring 
of that year through the fall, I become as desolate and gloomy 
as I was at the time. Somehow in our lives we seem to get into 
fights like this all the time, and perhaps I get this feeling be-
cause to this day I’ve never really extricated myself from that 
one. (1)
The story is quickly given a concrete place and time: an “undistin-
guished school in a small town” and “March of that year, when the 
Liberal Party government was making its last stand” (1), the latter refer-
ring to the tail end of Syngman Rhee’s administration and anticipating 
the mass protests that would bring down his increasingly repressive rule. 
The narrative thus hints at the correct political and historical context 
with which to interpret the story, at the same time it positions it as 
mere background. It is this single year, pregnant with enormous hope 
yet retrospectively a failure, that frames Our Twisted Hero. The fight 
that the narrator “never really extricated” himself from is the one the 
Korean nation never really resolved either: how did the successful “4.19” 
Revolution which peacefully ousted the Rhee regime result in Park’s 
1961 military coup, and almost three more decades of authoritarian 
governments? From the outset, it seems, Pyongt’ae’s tale demands to be 
read as an allegory of the political life of the nation. 
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In Angus Fletcher’s influential 2006 essay “Allegory Without Ideas”, 
allegory is defined as “a method of double meanings that organizes ut-
terance … according to its expression of analogical parallels between 
different networks of iconic likeness” (10). In other words, 
Allegorical narratives, say a biblical parable or an Aesopian 
fable such as Animal Farm, lead us to imagine a set of meanings 
located on the other side of [a] hermeneutic wall. In political 
and cultural terms, these meanings lying on the other side of 
the wall comprise parts of the whole of an ideology—its com-
mentary and interpretation. (10)
Allegory thus involves the simultaneous presentation of a narrative as 
well as its “commentary and interpretation”. Yet, for Fletcher, what is 
most striking about allegory—and what accounts for its enduring popu-
larity as a mode of expression—is that “it permits the iconic rendering 
of power relations” (9). Fletcher traces the allegorical mode from medi-
eval to modern use, arguing that for Christian allegorical narratives, the 
hermeneutical systems, while complex, were in the final instance fixed 
and essentialized: “the standard medieval interpretive system yields an 
allegory of ideas … [as] an allegory of essences” (15). Divine authority 
is posited as the unchanging cause behind power. In the modern era, al-
legory remains concerned with the articulation of power relations, but is 
unhinged from first causes; in Fletcher’s terminology, it becomes an “al-
legory without ideas.” In a story such as Yi’s, we must therefore account 
for both the schoolyard narrative and the “set of meanings located on 
the other side of [the] hermeneutical wall”7 as productions and reflec-
tions of the social realities of the day. If there are no longer any divine 
causes, what kind of power relations are inscribed by this simultaneous 
act of narrative and interpretation? What purpose does the allegorical 
mode have in Yi’s text, and what kind of prime mover does it posit?8
At the outset, Yi’s allegory presents the bully-as-dictator’s power as a 
function of the colonial, the rural, and the unmodern. Pyongt’ae moves 
to the “undistinguished school in a small town” from Seoul where he 
had attended a “prestigious” elementary school and where his father had 
been a high-ranking civil servant (1–2). The new school is marked by 
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its colonial history and a disappointing provincial atmosphere: “To me, 
this old Japanese-style building, with its plastered exterior and its few 
ramshackle tar-painted board classrooms, seemed indescribably shabby” 
(2). Dissatisfied with the smallness of the school and the unkempt ap-
pearance of his new teacher, Pyongt’ae is further dismayed to find the 
“backwards” practice of segregated boys’ and girls’ classes. Expecting 
“his cosmopolitan education will impress everyone” (Steinberg 64), he 
finds his new classmates are uninterested in his former achievements at 
the city school, where he got “the top award in a number of contests 
at the Seoul level” (Yi 4). Instead of trying to ascertain his academic 
and class standing, the other boys are only interested in naïvely asking 
“whether I had been on a tram, had seen South Gate [Namdaemun], and 
other questions of this sort” (5). 
Indeed, the distance between his set of values and the small-town view 
of his classmates sets him apart as a comparatively worldly protagonist, 
allowing us to posit an fairly standard notion of cosmopolitanism—ur-
banity, modernity and sophistication—as the text’s initial counterforce 
to tyranny. Pyongt’ae differentiates himself from the others precisely in 
having allegiances to something greater than the petty fiefdom he en-
counters in the rural classroom. He is shocked by the “flagrantly inap-
propriate behavior” (15) of Sokdae who orders the other children about, 
has the pick of their school lunches and even has the teacher under his 
sway. Not only is the move to the small town perceived as a move “back-
wards”, the school’s social system under Sokdae’s regime is presented 
as the antithesis to Pyongt’ae’s urban-cultivated values of aestheticism 
(he excels in art) and liberal ideas of freedom. Pyongt’ae greets this new 
environment with anger and constant comparison with his old school 
in Seoul; this system “founded on irrationality and violence” (16) goes 
against “the principles of reason and freedom by which I had been reared 
all my life” (15). The conceit of the retrospective narrative allows for an 
adult’s vocabulary of liberalism and rights to describe that most unfree 
of situations: childhood, and the unchecked power of bullies who rule it. 
He complains, to no avail, to his father how back in Seoul, “things were 
decided reasonably by election and that no restraints were put on our 
freedom” (17), blind to the fact that part of the “freedom” he enjoyed 
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there was due to his class privilege. For the adult Pyongt’ae ventriloquis-
ing his child-self, the ideal political organization is defined by reason, 
electoral process and the sanctity of individual rights. Allegorically, we 
may read the tale simply as South Korea’s unfulfilled desire for inde-
pendent nationhood after decades of Japanese colonialism, followed by 
the humiliating slicing of the peninsula by postwar superpowers. Such 
liberal values seem only natural for a cosmopolitan subject from Seoul, 
the undisputed locus of Korean modernity and politics. 
3. Global Designs and The End (or Beginning) of the Nation-State
Yi’s evocative tale of tyranny and the resistance to it does not allow us 
to forget it is set against a very specific colonial and postcolonial his-
tory, one that alludes to the complex geopolitical roles of Japan, North 
Korea, and the U.S. It is necessary, therefore, to historicize what at first 
seems like Pyongt’ae’s all too natural cosmopolitan ideals of freedom 
and liberal rights. As recent scholarship on cosmopolitanism reveals, the 
attempt to recover any “originary”, or pure, cosmopolitan impulse only 
results in earlier historical constructions of freedoms and unfreedoms. 
As Cheah points out, cosmopolitan concepts such as Kant’s and those 
of the Declaration of Human Rights are not an a priori fact owing to 
innate human dignity, but contingent and contaminated responses to 
the inhuman conditions that make up our world. The first task is to de-
termine the specific conditions of any kind of universalizing force—the 
foremost being global capitalism—that constitute the historical matrix 
for the “ethico-political work that nationalism and cosmopolitanism 
can do” (Cheah “Introduction” 31). 
Walter Mignolo’s work on critical cosmopolitanisms similarly views 
cosmopolitanism in a dialectical fashion, and usefully rethinks both the 
assumed temporality and locality of the concept. In his wide-ranging 
analysis, he outlines several fundamental historical stages of cosmopolitan 
discourses, or what he calls those “set[s] of projects toward planetary 
conviviality” (157). Each arises in response to a stage of imperialist 
geopolitical ordering—those “global designs” which “manage the 
world” (157). Pushing back the inauguration of modern cosmopolitan 
thinking from Kant’s peaceful confederation of (European) nations to the 
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sixteenth-century Salamanca School of the Spanish Empire (164–166), 
Mignolo’s main three stages of global designs and their corresponding 
cosmopolitanisms are as follows: first, Spanish/Portuguese imperialism 
and the Salamanca school of Christian philosophy; second, eighteenth-
century Enlightenment and nationalism, with Kant and the Declaration 
of Rights of Man and Citizen; and finally, Cold War U.S. imperialism 
and the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights. It is crucial to note that 
Mignolo’s three historical incarnations of cosmopolitanisms are responses 
from within the geopolitical organization of their respective global 
designs; that is, Christian philosophy, Kantian ethics or human rights 
do not arise ex nihilo, but as specific reactions to certain organizational 
visions of the world. They are thus constitutively linked to what Mignolo 
succinctly calls “coloniality”—“the hidden face of modernity” (158)—
or the exploitative arrangement of power along exclusionary racial or 
religious lines. We can think of these cosmopolitan discourses as the 
conceptual means by which others, or units of others, are potentially 
processed as belonging to a single planetary system.9 While such 
discourses have liberatory aspects (the sixteenth-century ascription of 
souls to Amerindians, for example), they remain limited by their very 
epistemologies (only Christian souls count as human). In this sense, 
cosmopolitanism is best understood as a set of contingent and embedded 
attempts to negotiate within the universalizing discourses of power itself. 
Let us look more closely at Mignolo’s third stage of cosmopolitanism 
discourse, that of postwar U.S. imperialism, the Cold War and the 
UN Declaration of Human Rights—the broader context in which 
the national allegory of Our Twisted Hero plays out. How might we 
rethink this moment through the lens of the postcolonial nation-state’s 
turbulent career? Let us recall, of course, that the spread of nationalism 
as a force against imperialism was the general path taken by the colonial 
world, resulting in two major waves of decolonization: the first in Latin 
America during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and the 
second in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean from roughly the 1950s-1970s 
and later. Yet this latter movement, which saw the establishment of 
some ninety new nations (Brennan 1), coincided with the beginning of 
a shift away from national sovereignty towards internationally enshrined 
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human rights, with the nominally global powers of the UN replacing 
the European emphasis of the League of Nations. For a good number 
of cosmopolitan narratives, the crucial theorist behind this moment is 
Hannah Arendt and her rethinking of the nation-state in the aftermath 
of World War II. 
For Arendt, cosmopolitanism is the liberation from national sov-
ereignty—that political form which had disastrously linked state rights 
to ethnic belonging—and its unbridled powers (Young 2). In Robert 
Young’s gloss, Arendtian cosmopolitanism is “a new international 
perspective and order that could establish legal and ethical standards 
for a world in which the sovereign state, the guarantor of the rights 
of the citizen, is seen to have failed” (Young 2). Following the UN 
declaration of 1948, it is no longer states and their international 
treaties that constitute the world order, but the discourse of human 
rights that put pressure on states to be answerable to individual rights. 
In this conceptual history, cosmopolitanism is the necessary ethical 
response to the inherent tyranny of the modern nation-state, excessively 
demonstrated by European fascism and the postwar problem of stateless 
minorities. While Arendt had little to say on anti-colonial revolutions, 
her analysis of the nation-state form and the dangers of its unchecked 
territorial power has become a commonplace;10 witness the almost daily 
interventions or interventionist policies of the UN regarding sovereign 
nation-states deemed to be violating human rights. Yet Arendt’s 
cosmopolitan critique of the nation-state has been somewhat double-
edged for the postcolonial world, not least because most of the UN 
interventions occur in these regions. The very moment the nation’s 
inherent flaws are declared is also the moment that, with the crumbling 
of modern empires, the majority of the globe is adopting this political 
form for the first time.11 Mignolo describes the paradoxical temporality 
of postcolonial nationhood whereby “[d]ecolonized countries were 
striving for a nation-state, at the same time that the ideologues of the 
new world order no longer believed in them” (Mignolo 176). 
It is therefore too simple to assume the “political life of the 
Korean nation”, with its struggle for freedom against the backwards, 
authoritarian power of Park Chung Hee, is the stable allegorical object 
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of Yi’s story. Rather, I suggest we examine the layered allegorical means 
whereby both a local cosmopolitanism (Pyong’tae/Korea’s desire for 
freedom) and a broader one (where Korea’s sovereignty comes with 
strings attached) enter the text differentially as challenges to the excesses 
of territorial rule. In other words, if we look more closely, we see that 
neither the power wielded by Sokdae (or Park Chung Hee), nor the 
liberatory values that challenge it can be hermeneutically mapped 
onto a clear operation of power. Instead, we must recognize that such 
cosmopolitanisms are always contingent, historical, and compromised, 
resulting from the dissemination over a century or more of competing 
ideals that do not make sense without the phenomena of modern 
colonialism, decolonisation or Cold War antagonisms. For example, 
the spread of Woodrow Wilson’s ideas on “national self-determination” 
partly inspired Korea’s March 1st movement of 1919, the first major 
nationalist protest against Japanese rule. As Mignolo has argued, this 
does not mean that ideals such as nationalism should be repudiated, but 
that they mask a range of other possible forms of justice and political 
community, as well as the colonial and neocolonial power relations of 
which they are necessarily a product. It also means that Hero’s allegory of 
national freedom versus unfreedom cannot be quite so straightforward. 
After six long months of the solitary attempt to resist the regime, 
Pyongt’ae finally gives in to the brutality of Sokdae’s kingdom. But his 
capitulation is not just about avoiding social ostracization and beatings. 
One chilly afternoon after an exam day, Sokdae organizes a group of 
boys to bring supplies—candy, soft drink, sweet potatoes for roasting—
to a riverbank clearing near a pine grove. “To grown ups it was a bleak 
place, with just a few factory buildings left over from Japanese times 
that had been half demolished in an air raid, but for boys it was fine 
place to play” (83). Under Sokdae’s direction, “we proceeded to turn 
the demolished factory building into the greatest playground in the 
world” (88), where they spend the afternoon singing, laughing, eating 
and playing. For Pyongt’ae, it is as if the entire, perfect day were just for 
him: “[Sokdae] treated me as if I ranked differently than the others, and 
he directed the entertainment of the day almost as if it were a banquet 
for me” (84). We learn that Sokdae’s peaceful kingdom also excels at 
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the organization of pleasure. By the time Pyongt’ae has spent several 
months under the Sokdae system, he hopes for nothing more than its 
permanence: “I hoped and believed that his order, his kingdom, and 
the special benefits I enjoyed, would last forever” (85). Moreover, this 
regime proves to be more efficient than the democratic one Pyongt’ae 
initially desires; under Sokdae’s allocation of student resources (he gives 
“fight rankings” and “study rankings”), the class consistently wins the 
school’s academic and tidiness awards. Corrupt participation is thus 
fleshed out as an entirely rational choice to take. 
The brief happiness and peace Pyongt’ae enjoys as subject of Sokdae’s 
benevolent monarchy is short-lived, and it is from here that the novella 
gets really interesting. A new teacher to the school, embodying the 
principles of liberal political reform, discovers the bully’s racket and, 
after making the students denounce Sokdae and his abuses, initiates 
democratic class elections. To instil an American-style flavor to the 
reforms, he hands out copies of U.S. President Kennedy’s Profiles in 
Courage to the students. The class’s “unexpected revolution” precipitates 
an all too accurate depiction of a major problem of post-dictatorship 
democratic reforms, the problem of ex-collaborators: “The best boys 
had either helped Sokdae steal the teacher’s trust and favor by taking 
exams for him, or they had been Sokdae’s accomplices” (106). Yi goes 
on to describe the very real difficulties of the transition to electoral 
“democracy” in the way some students “constantly changed their 
minds”, while others “quietly dreamed of little Sokdaes” (108), as 
well as the blatant tedium of the process for which the new teacher 
offers no apology. It is clear that of the two systems, it is the tyrannical 
and corrupt one that actually offers more potential for pleasure and 
collective efficiency. Council meetings and ballot voting—following a 
lofty, U.S.-inspired ideal of democracy—are accurately represented for 
their substantial shortcomings: they are boring and tedious and tend to 
get bogged down by any “paltry offense in the suggestion box” (110). 
Pyongt’ae’s previous absolute faith in rights and democracy cannot now 
but appear hollow and idealistic. 
Yet much more troubling is the violence that such reforms involve. 
After discovering Sokdae’s homework and lunchtime rackets, the 
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new teacher publicly and brutally thrashes the bully, followed—quite 
shockingly—by an equally vicious beating of the boys who let “what 
was rightfully yours” (95) be taken away. Having escaped the “tyranny” 
of Sokdae, the class is literally beaten into submission by an idealized 
liberal democratic system. The novella effectively allegorizes the Western 
cosmopolitan discourse that Cheah has argued hypocritically “claims 
to be the pure voice of reason representing genuine universality and to 
serve as an external check on particular interests and material forces” 
(Inhuman Conditions 161), and yet which is entirely consistent with 
Third World subordination. Mignolo concurs in observing that while 
“human rights served as an instrument to promote liberal democracy 
against communism” (176), they helped prescribe a narrow set of 
acceptable cosmopolitan values, and paradoxically supported the spread 
of dictatorships and neoliberalist regimes in the Third World. Yi’s 
novella thus pointedly raises the question: is a local tyrant better than 
an international one? 
4. Undecidable Allegories
We might read the successive crises of Hero as follows: first, as depicting 
the loss of cosmopolitan values, the fall into authoritarianism and cor-
ruption; then, conversely, the violence and dearth of enjoyment in the 
U.S.-style democratic processes that the new teacher enforces. On the 
one side appears not enough cosmopolitanism; on the other, the darker 
side of its global design is revealed. Yet, I argue that there is a third crisis 
revealed precisely through the allegorical mechanism described above, 
whereby the hermeneutical object of the allegory—the classroom stand-
ing in for the dictator’s regime—cannot be limited or circumscribed as 
such and therefore reformed. Rather, what we see is the very breakdown 
of allegory due to the insufficiency of narrow cosmopolitan discourses—
understood as civic and individual rights, the ballot box, and electoral 
democracy—to counter the actual power relations underlying contem-
porary social reality. 
Regarding the hermeneutical insufficiency of allegory, Fletcher makes 
two interesting points. First, he reminds us that allegory is “the authori-
tarian mode of literature and art and discourse [in] its claims to be able 
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to project permanent truths” (Fletcher 21, italics added); that is, it is the 
literary form that most anticipates and directs our interpretive process. 
Yet, at the same time, the attempt to “control symbols of power” (27) 
also reveals the “deep internal conflict, or evasion, at the heart of an 
ambivalent allegorical procedure that seems to contradict itself, by its 
very operations” (Fletcher 28). As we see in Hero, the desire to project 
the “truth” of power relations and reveal its prime movers shifts the nar-
rative uneasily from one allegorical object to another: at first it seems to 
reside in a personage (Sokdae or Park), then in U.S.-style reforms (the 
teacher or Kennedy) and finally, as we shall see, in the economic life of 
the nation. 
In the perplexing coda to the story, the narrator gives an abbreviated 
account of his life after school. After graduating from a top university, 
he works for one of the large conglomerates, or chaebols—the massive, 
multi-industry companies backed by Park Chung Hee’s regime and cru-
cial to the nation’s economic take-off. Underestimating their centrality 
to national economic life, Pyongt’ae quits after a short time, not want-
ing “to waste my youth and talent working for a group where there was 
no freedom on the job, where the management was full of hypocrites, and 
where the promotion process was unjust” (113–4, italics added). Faced 
with these unfreedoms, Pyong’tae neither rebels nor submits: he simply 
dismisses the companies as economic follies. Noticing the improbable 
success of some of his friends, he is busy chasing after any chance to 
“squeeze into a corner of their rich table” (115). After opting out for a 
more meager but independent life in sales, he discovers some years later 
that “the large conglomerates, which I had felt to be castles made of 
sand, were actually prospering” (114). What had seemed, in short, the 
chaebols’ authoritarian and unsound practices—their lack of freedom, 
hypocrisy and injustice, implicitly echoing Sokdae’s rule—turn out to 
be the very principles on which the country’s development is predi-
cated. Finally, despite eventually making a humble living as a private 
institute (hagwo˘n) lecturer, Pyongt’ae can determine no logic behind 
his peers’ successes or failures, and feels “as if I had been thrown into a 
cruel kingdom that ran things as it wished” (116). What is striking is 
that this “cruel kingdom” now no longer refers to Sokdae’s regime, nor 
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the new teacher’s violent reforms, nor even the chaebol businesses. In the 
coda, corruption, lack of freedom, and the arbitrary rule of hypocrites 
turn out to better describe the normative conditions of the postcolonial 
nation under globalized post-Fordism. 
We could say that it is the confusion over just where Sokdae’s “cruel 
kingdom” begins and ends that is both most troubling for the narrator 
and most interesting for the allegory. If the wider social and economic 
realities of the country actually operate along such corrupt principles, 
what good is the allegorical appeal to a cosmopolitan, liberal political 
sphere? In short, the tale reveals that the principles of reason, fairness, 
individual rights, free speech and justice—values enshrined in human 
rights discourse and represented in clichéd, American form by the 
teacher’s reforms—cannot be the ones that actually organize a postco-
lonial society’s pursuit of modernization and wealth. Laudable on their 
own terms, they do nothing to address the nation’s subordinate posi-
tion within global coloniality, where the global south perpetually plays 
catch-up and is unable to control “the production of production”, or 
the possibilities for its own development.12 Where at first the rule of 
Sokdae represented the state of exception, what we realize in the coda is 
its very unexceptionality. The problem is not the contrast between dic-
tatorial and democratic rule—between Park Chung Hee and President 
Kennedy, the lack of rights or a cosmopolitan recognition of them—but 
rather the contrast between politics as an formally abstract and separate 
sphere, and the global, political-economic system that dictates actual 
possibilities for postcolonial development.
At the very end of the story, the narrator chances upon a final en-
counter with the adult Sokdae. Now a small-time crook, the latter is 
arrested on a train, and the narrator realizes that after all, “he was just 
one among the poor, ineffectual lot of us” (119). The final words of 
the narrator confound the attempt to come to any conclusions about 
Sokdae’s reappearance: “In the end, I shed a few tears, but whether they 
were for me or for him, whether from relief for the world, or from a 
new pessimism, I still really don’t know” (120). The indeterminacy of 
the ending similarly confounds the reader’s attempt to pin down the 
proper allegorical reading: is the “relief ” for the post-1987 political re-
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forms? Or does the narrator’s “new pessimism” indicate that things will 
not really change? At any rate, we come to recognize that the point of 
Yi’s schoolyard tale is not to allegorize the country’s oppressive politi-
cal life with its suspect elections and military leaders, a situation to be 
countered by political liberalization and the cosmopolitan application 
of human rights. In contrast, it is to allegorize the way corruption and 
injustice have imperceptibly structured the public and economic life 
of the nation more generally. In this sense, it is impossible to cordon 
off “national political life” as the arena pertaining to allegory’s “iconic 
rendering of power relations”. I argue, instead, that Hero presents a 
more ambitious “cosmopolitical” allegory: by describing the material 
and ideological paradoxes of postcolonial development, we see how the 
inhuman demands made by Cold War comprador capitalism cannot be 
squared with the metropolitan core’s shrill insistence on liberal political 
rights. 
A cosmopolitanism which deals only with the West’s failed states begs 
the question with regard to the Third World’s numerous authoritarian 
regimes. An urgent critical task is therefore to recognize that postcolo-
nial states operate within the same global political-economic framework 
as the West, one that touts human rights and cosmopolitan values for 
all, yet which doesn’t acknowledge the history of colonial difference or 
the way “cosmopolitan values” unfairly favor the former imperial center. 
A critical, cosmopolitical approach must include revisiting the unequal 
beginnings of nation-states and re-examining the conditions in which 
they variously established themselves. We may now make the claim that 
for postcolonial nations, cosmopolitanism does not merely “challenge” 
or “wither away” national sovereignty, but is one of the very conditions 
of its coming into being. 
By means of its undecidable allegory, Yi Munyo˘l’s novella illustrates 
the complexity of struggles and desires that result from such conditions. 
Moreover, it leads inexorably to the question, what other models and 
values of freedom and justice might be available? Such a questioning 
of cosmopolitanism has two important results: first, a shift from the 
concern with metropolitan articulations of inclusion, since all planetary 
subjects have already participated—or been forced to participate—in 
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one global design or another; and second, that the critical task of the 
day is not an enumeration of proliferating cultural perspectives as they 
are unfettered from territoriality, but of an alternative cosmopolitan 
discourse that will confront the inequalities inherent to the “manage-
rial global designs of ideologues and executives” (Mignolo 179). The 
text thus calls not for a more cosmopolitan, universal or global culture, 
but a reimagining of the conditions in which political reforms would not 
come with neocolonial violence, and where exploitative international 
economic relations would not mean national “success”. 
Despite Yi’s clear choice of genre, the novella is unable, finally, to 
name the object it is allegorizing: it becomes difficult to identify the po-
litical from the economic, the rational from the irrational, the just from 
the unjust, the national from the global. Far from reading Yi Munyo˘l as 
another cosmopolitan author writing about the all too familiar political 
misfortunes of the non-West, we are compelled to think through these 
events as occurring within our own global political-economic system. 
The novella’s cosmopolitical allegory thus interrogates not cultural be-
longing and identity, but the global systems of production and accumu-
lation that determine their possibility. In this reading, we are obliged to 
cosmopolitanize the differential experiences of political economy, rather 
than only those of cultural difference and identity.13 By refusing to offer 
an easy allegorical reading of the “other”, Yi’s simple tale invites us to 
think of other forms of “planetary conviviality”. 
Notes
 1 I am grateful to Joe Keith, Emily Johansen, Naomi Schiller and Bryce de Reynier 
for their enormously helpful comments and suggestions on this article.
 2 Some of these include “vernacular cosmopolitanism” (Homi Bhabha); “discrep-
ant cosmopolitanism” (James Clifford); “postcolonial cosmopolitanism” (Benita 
Parry); and “subaltern cosmopolitanism” (Robert Young; Boaventura do Sousa 
Santos).
 3 For the seminal account of the active differentiation between metropolitan 
and peripheral nations, see Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye. See also Frank 
on underdevelopment. On the growing differentiation between a semi-
industrialized and non-industrialized Third World, see Amin. Finally, for a more 
contemporary and capacious analysis of peripheralization under neoliberalism, 
see Surin’s Freedom Not Yet.
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 4 The 2008–9 financial crisis showed, however, that the peripheral countries will 
certainly bear the brunt of the system’s failures.
 5 In the case of the U.S., I am thinking, for example, of Appiah’s work. For Europe 
see recent work by Beck and Benhabib. See also Gikandi regarding the problem 
of a “pan-national European” cosmopolitanism in Paul Gilroy’s recent work. 
 6 Park Chung Hee set up the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (now National 
Intelligence Service) at the beginning of his first term in 1961. In 1979, Park was 
assassinated by his former right-hand man and KCIA head, Kim Jae-kyu, lead-
ing to the installation of another authoritarian president, General Chun Doo-
whan, widespread political unrest and the bloody Kwangju massacre of 1980. 
 7 In Surin’s account of global culture, allegory emerges as a privileged representa-
tional means partly due to the fact that in post-Fordist accumulation, “even the 
notion of ‘exchange’ has become perversely allegorized” (“On Producing” 206).
 8 We should note that allegory has no privileged status in Korean literary history 
equivalent to the Christian allegorical tradition of the West. However, mod-
ern Korean prose fiction has borrowed and adapted all sorts of Western literary 
forms from realism to modernism, and allegorical interpretation has long been 
an accepted literary tool. 
 9 The project of interrogating the affective dimensions of this process is not in 
essence different from the one interrogating national belonging, described by 
Anderson. As Robbins writes, “the global scale is not ethically and politically dis-
tinct from other, smaller scales, as the hegemony of the nation-state form has led 
it to appear” (Feeling Global 5). Like nationalism, cosmopolitanisms may vary 
greatly from popular, religious, secular, welfare, to official and authoritarian. 
 10 In Arendt’s now classic book The Origins of Totalitarianism, she outlines two 
broad historical roots to totalitarianism: anti-Semitism and imperialism. Both 
deal with the history of racism, but interestingly, it is through imperialism that 
the old logic of racism and the ideology of common origin becomes tied to the 
modern nation-state and its bureaucratic forms “as a principle of foreign domi-
nation” (Arendt 185). It is only in the modern nation-state that, disastrously, 
“the state was partly transformed from an instrument of the law into an instru-
ment of the nation” (23).
 11 Malcomson wryly notes a very little quoted line of Kant’s which describes cos-
mopolitanism as involving “a regular process of improvement in the political 
constitutions of our continent (which will probably legislate eventually for all 
other continents)” (Kant qtd. in Malcomson 237). This imitative logic, moreo-
ver, the process that Anderson has described. See Chapter 7 “The Last Wave” on 
postcolonial nationalisms. 
 12 Some may argue that South Korea’s relative rise in GDP and wealth has raised its 
position from Third World to “middling power” (it is now touted as one of the 
world’s top 20 economies). Yet such success, as I have indicated, is predicated 
on its unique Cold War position and the exploitation of its subaltern position 
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in the international division of labor. Consider, too, that its continued viability 
now relies on investment in ever-cheaper labor economies (China, Thailand, 
Vietnam) which relies on and perpetuates the same formula or exploiting sub-
altern nations. 
 13 I am following Bruce Robbins’ idea of responsibility to difference, and not 
merely recognition of difference. Public lecture on Cosmopolitanism. New York 
University, February 4, 2010. 
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